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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ~ 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
JOH;·EDWARDS, ( 
Defendarnt and Appellant. } 
Case 
No. 9525 
BRIEF OF RESP·ONDENT 
NATURE OF CASE 
The defendant was convicted of profiting by the earn-
ings of fallen women in violation of 76-53-10, U.C.A. 1953, 
upon trial in the Second Judicial District, and claims 
errors of evidence require reversal and a new trial. 
RELIEF SOUGHT 
The State seeks the affirmance of the jury's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State will adopt the preliminary statement of 
facts set out in the defendant's brief as being essentially 
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correct, but will add facts contained in the record where 
relevant to the issues raised on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT 
CONCERNING HIS WIFE'S PLEA OF GUILTY 
TO THE CHARGE OF PROSTITUTION WAS 
RELEVANT TO IMPEACH THE DEFENDANT 
CONCERNING HIS ASSERTIONS AS TO HER 
GOOD CHARACTER AND ON OTHER ISSUES. 
POINT II. 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT 
CONCERNING HIS PREVIOUS STAYS IN JAIL 
AND CONVICTIONS WAS RELEVANT TO IM-
PEACH THE DEFENDANT SINCE HE PLACED 
HIS CHARACTER INTO ISSUE AND MADE 
STATEMENTS CONCERNING HIS ACTIVI-
TIES WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT WITH 
THE FACTS OF SUCH JAIL STAYS AND 
CONVICTIONS. 
POINT III. 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE DEFEND-
ANT WAS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PROPER 
CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
PorNT IV. 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CONVIC-
TIONS AND HIS WIFE'S PLEA OF GUILTY 
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ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE CROSS-EXAI'vHNATION OF DEFENDANT 
CONCERNING HIS WIFE'S PLEA OF GUILTY 
TO THE CHARGE OF PROSTITUTION WAS 
RELEVANT TO Il'APEACH THE DEFENDANT 
CONCERNING HIS ASSERTIONS AS TO HER 
GOOD CHARACTER AND ON OTHER ISSUES. 
The defendant has contended that because he was 
cross-examined as to his wife's plea of guilty to the 
crime of prostitution, that the trial court thus committed 
prejudicial error. The record discloses the following rele-
vant facts relating to that issue. After the prosecution 
had presented its case, defense counsel made his open-
ing statement in which he said with reference to the 
defendant's wife. (R. 39): 
"His wife is not a fallen woman which I think will 
come out later, which is one of the elements that 
the prosecution is required to prove.'' 
Thereafter, the defendant took the stand and testified 
(R. 42): 
'' Q. To your your knowledge, what type of woman 
is your wife~ 
''A. My wife is a working woman and kind of a 
business woman. She don't believe in doing wrong. 
She doesn't curse. 
"Q. Would you call your wife a fallen woman~ 
''A. I believe she is true to her husband and I 
believe she is a woman that don't do prostitute 
because I have never known her to do it." 
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On cross-examination the following occurred: (R. 45) 
"Q. You testified that she didn't practice prosti-
tution~ 
"A. No, sir, she doesn't I know that. 
'' Q. You testified that you have known this and 
you know that she would never do such a thing~ 
"A. Yes, sir, I never knowed her to do that, sir. 
That is the truth that Jesus could tell you. 
"Q. Now you were with your wife when she was 
booked in this police station the night of February 
17, booked for prostitution~" 
"MR. FRoRER: Objection. 
''THE CouRT: Ojection is overruled. You may 
ask.'' 
'' Q. You were right there when she was booked 
for prostitution and gave her name Shirley Jean 
Edwards and stated she was your wife~ 
''A. Yes, sir. 
"Q. You are aware of the fact that she plead 
guilty to that charge are you not~ 
''A. Well, she didn't know what prostitution 
means because she had never heard of prostitution 
in her life. In fact she can't hardly speak Eng-
lish. She don't know what the word prostitution 
means. I have never spoke that word to her. 
"Q. You have never spoke such a word to her~ 
"A. That is right." 
Further at pages 49-50 : 
"Q. And your wife wouldn't know what the word 
prostitution meant~ 
''A. No, she doesn't know. 
4 
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''Q. That is why she plead guilty to the charge~ 
''A. Yes, sir. 
• • * 
'' Q. You say your wife is a good woman and has 
worked regularly~ 
''A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. And hasn't been around jails or anything of 
that sort to even know what this thing means~ 
"A. No, sir." 
It should be further noted that the Trial Judge, in 
instructing the jury, required finding that the woman in 
question would act as a prostitute (R. 11), and further 
noted that defendant had denied that his wife ever indi-
cated a willingness to so act (R. 41). 
It is submitted that based upon the above record, the 
prosecutor acted well within the bounds of proper de-
meanor in questioning the defendant. The defendant con-
tends that State v. Justesen, 35 Utah 105, 99 Pac. 456 
(1909), stands for the proposition that the action of the 
prosecutor in questioning the defendant with reference 
to his wife's conviction was error. It does not. The Jus-
tess en case involved the attempt of the prosecutor to offer 
the record of a plea of guilty of a co-conspirator who 
committed perjury where the defendant was charged with 
subordination. The offer was a direct attempt to use the 
plea of guilty as independent proof in support of the 
crime charged when not relevant. 
The instant situation is not so concerned. In the 
instant case the matter was brought out on cross-exami-
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nation to rebut and attack the veracity of the defendant 
with reference to his assertions as to his wife's character. 
This is an entirely different situation than that raised in 
Justesen. People v. Fa,rrell, 11 Utah 414, 40 Pac. 703 
(1895) is no authority for defendant's contentions either, 
since it merely stands for the proposition that the admis-
sion of a co-conspirator is not admissible after the 
conspiracy has ceased. The conclusion results that none 
of the authorities cited by defendant support the conten-
tion of error. 
It will be conceded that a plea of guilty by one of two 
persons charged with a crime arising from the same 
incident is not usually admissible as against the other to 
prove guilt, but must otherwise become relevant. In this 
instance, the fact that the defendant's wife plead guilty 
was directly relevant to impeach the defendant's veracity 
with respect to his wife's character. In State v. Haugen-
sen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P.2d 229 (1936), it was noted: 
''There are two methods of discrediting evidence. 
First, to show that the evidence itself is untrue 
and unreliable; and second, to show that the trans-
mitter of the testimony is unreliable, either be-
cause of bad memory, failure to accurately record 
impressions, or because of lack of veracity.'' 
In the instant case, where the defendant saw fit to 
put his wife's character in issue, the fact that she had 
plead guilty to the crime of prostitution tended to im-
peach the defendant's assertion that she ·was a woman of 
excellent character, and thus impeached the transmitter's 
veracity. Therefore, the cross-examination was directly 
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relevant to the second form of discrediting evidence noted 
in the H ougensen case. 
In Michelson v. United States,. 335 U. S. 469 (1948), 
the United States Supreme Court recognized that it was 
permissible to inquire of a witness who testifies as to the 
good character o~ reputation of a defendant, whether 
they were aware of the defendant's arrest some 26 years 
before. The Court noted that : 
"It was proper cross-examination because reports 
of his arrest for receiving stolen goods, if ad-
mitted, would tend to weaken the assertion that he 
was known as an honest and law abiding citizen. 
The cross-examination may take in as much 
ground as the testimony it is designed to verify. 
To hold otherwise would give defendant the bene-
fit of testimony that he was honest and law-abid-
ing in reputation when such might not be the 
fact; * * *." 
By the same token, to allow the defendant in the instant 
case to falsely assert that his wife was a woman of chaste 
and proper character, where he knew of the fact that she 
plead guilty to prostitution, would allow him to assert 
as a fact, something which, in view of her plea, may defi-
nitely not be true, and which, if he knew of her plea, would 
tend to diminish the veracity of his testimony. Thus the 
cross-examination was perfectly proper to attack the de-
fendant's veracity. Indeed, even the defendant recognizes 
that it was so admissible for credibility purposes. (De-
fendant's Brief, p. 14.) 
It is submitted that a second reason exists why the 
evidence was properly admitted. The defendant at-
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tempted to defend against the crime charged by assert-
ing that his wife was of good character, and since his 
wife was of good character and would not engage in 
prostitution, that he could not, as a result, be guilty of 
procuring her for the purposes of prostitution. Thus, 
the character of the defendant's wife, a third person, was 
placed in issue by the defendant. In such a case the 
evidence of the wife's plea tended to directly refute the 
claim of her good character, and was for that reason ad-
missible. Sutton v. State, 124 Ga. 815, 53 S.E. 381 (1906). 
The rule is noted in Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 
68, where it is said: 
"Where the character offered is that of a third 
person, not a party to the cause, the reasons of 
policy for exclusion seem to disappear or become 
inconsiderable; hence if there is a.ny relevancy in 
the fact of character, i. e. if some act is involved 
upon the probability of which a moral trait can 
throw light, the character may well be received." 
(Emphasis supplied) 
In this instance the defendant placed the character 
of his wife in issue to dissipate the claim of his guilt, and 
cannot protest at having her character attacked to refute 
his claim. 
Finally, a third basis exists whereby the cross-exami-
nation of defendant on such an issue is relevant and ad-
missible. It is based upon the fact that the defendant's 
wife's character was a matter of evidence. Thus, the de-
fense counsel noted that it must be proven that the 
defendant's wife was a "fallen woman," and the trial 
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court instructed on the elements such as to make the pros-
ecution bear the burden of proving the woman, defend-
ant's wife, to be a prostitute. Under these circumstances, 
the wife's character was an evidentiary issue. Wigmore, 
Evidence, 3rd Ed., Vol. I, p. 491, 509. Thus, as to the 
particular class of crime with which the defendant was 
here charged, an exception for the purposes of proving 
character arises. Thus, it is noted in Wigmore, op. cit., 
Sec. 204: 
"It has already been seen that, apart from stat-
utes constituting the repute of the house as the 
sole element of the crime of professional pan-
dering, the character or use of the house and the 
character or occupation of the inmates may come 
into issue. Two questions having a bearing here 
are thus presented. (1) May particular instances 
of prostitution in the house be offered, as showing 
its habitual character~ (2) May particular acts 
of prostitution by the inmates be offered, as show-
ing their occupation or character as prostitutes? 
Both these questions should be answered in the 
affirmative * * *." (Emphasis supplied) 
Thus, as Wigmore notes, where character is itself an ele-
ment or matter of proof, specific instances of prostitution 
or actions of such a nature are relevant. See State v. Tac-
coni, 110 Utah 212, 171 P. 2d 388 (1946) for a similar con-
clusion. In proving such character, the Supreme Court of 
North Dakota, in State v. Simpson, 78 N.D. 360, 49 N.W. 
2d 777 (1951), noted, where the charge was keeping a 
bawdy house : 
"One of the essential matters that the state had to 
prove was that the defendant maintained a house 
where illicit sexual intercourse was indulged in 
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contrary to the temporary injunction issued. The 
evidence that Judy Cox had been proceeded 
against and had plead guilty to prostitution in 
that house was very material to the issue raised. 
It bore directly on the character of the house main-
tained by the defendant.'' 
The Court held the plea of guilty was properly admitted 
under 42-0207 NDRC 1943. The plea of guilty thus went 
to the issue of the character of a third person that was 
itself relevant. In the instant case, the woman's char-
acter was relevant and her plea tended to prove that ele-
ment and thus be admissible. In State v. Taccowi, supra, 
the fact that the woman forfeited bail in answer to the 
offense was admitted. 
Thus, for three reasons, the defendant's position is 
not well taken. First, the evidence tended to impeach 
the defendant's veracity. Second, it rebutted the direct 
assrtions as to defendant's wife's character with its rela-
tion to his. Finally, it was directly relevant to an element 
of character in issue. 
PoiNT II. 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT 
CONCERNING HIS PREVIOUS STAYS IN JAIL 
AND CONVICTIONS VI AS RELEVANT TO IM-
PEACH THE DEFENDANT SINCE HE PLACED 
HIS CHARACTER INTO ISSUE AND MADE 
STATEMENTS CONCERNING HIS ACTIVI-
TIES WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT WITH 
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The defendant contends that the prosecutor's cross-
examination on his previous convictions for drunkenness 
and other misdemeanors was error. It is submitted, how-
ever, that an analysis of the record will show the exami-
nation to have been proper. 
On direct examination the accused testified (R. 41) : 
" * * * I have been working for her honestly. I 
have never sold her to no man in my life. Honest 
to God I haven't. I have never sold my wife and 
I wouldn't do that and I believe in the Bible. I 
believe in God Almighty too. My dad is a twenty-
second degree Masonic.'' 
The defendant testified, in addition, that he had been 
drinking with one of the prosecution's witnesses for two 
or three days prior to the day of the incident, and that he 
had been drinking on that day also (R. 40, 41). He fur-
ther testified that he had had about two fifths to drink 
so far that day, and maybe three (R. 42). He further 
noted that he thought the detective he had approached 
was going to take he and his wife to a liquor store (R. 41). 
On cross-examination the following occurred (R. 52): 
"Q. You state you have worked regularly and 
supported your wife1 
"A. Yes, sir. I have been working ever since I 
have been with her. I worked in Idaho until the 
spuds were over, this past summer up here in 
Rupert. I worked all over Idaho and Blackfoot, 
I worked in Toole Lake, California, loading spuds. 
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"Q. You state that you wouldn't do such a thing 
as to pander or something like that~ 
''A. No, sir. I raise my hand to Jesus and expect 
to go to hell if I did. It is the truth. I expect to go 
to hell when I die if I say that because Ialways 
believe in God and I continue to believe in Him. 
"Q. You were not working on June 9,1960, in Las 
V geas, Nevada, were you~ You were not working 
on that day~ 
''A. No, sir, I guess, I worked for a Jew down 
there for awhile. 
''Q. Did you spend some time in jail down in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, for being drunk~'' 
"~IR. FRoRER: I object. 
''THE CouRT: The objection is overruled, you may 
ask him.'' 
"Q. That is June 9, 1960, in Las Vegas, Nevada. 
You were not working then, were you~ 
''A. I was working there when I was there, yes 
sir, for a Jew there. 
'' Q. How long were you in jail down there for 
being drunk during the month of June~ 
''A. Well, I think it was 10 or 15 days, something 
like that. It may have been one day. I don't ex-
actly know the month. I know I was in there for 
being drunk, that is what I did time for, is being 
drunk. 
"Q. Let's go back in the month before that, May 
24, 1960, just less than a month before. The month 
of May, you were not working during that month, 
were you full time Y 
''A. I have been working off and on. I never 
missed a month of work in my life. 
12 
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"Q. You were in jail in Los Angeles part of the 
time, for being drunk in a public place~'' 
''A. I guess I was not, I was working for a Jew. 
'' Q. You working in the month of May of 1960 ~ 
"A. You can't work when you are in jail." 
A reading of the record from pages 52-55 demonstrates 
that the prosecution's cross-examination was proper for 
at least three reasons. First, it appears clear that on both 
direct and cross-examination the accused attempted to 
show that he was an honest, hard-working person, who 
kept employed all the time in an effort to support his wife, 
and thus would not resort to such activities as pandering. 
The defendant injected his own character into the pro-
ceedings, and thus opened the door for the prosecution 
to rebut. The defendant notes that some Utah cases have 
said that impeachment is limited to felonies, 1 but such is 
not the case where a defendant puts his or another's char-
acter in issue. In such instances, rebuttal of the character 
trait by any means relevant thereto is permissible. State 
v. Thompson, 58 Utah 291, 199 Pac. 161 (1921); State v. 
Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P. 2d 861 ( 1948). Wigmore has 
noted the rule in the following terms : 
''After a defendant has attempted to show his 
good character in his own aid, prosecution may 
in rebuttal offer as evidence his bad character. 
The true reason for this seems to be, not any re-
laxation of the principle, just mentioned, i.e. not a 
1 The defendant cites State v. Hougensen, 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 2d 229 
(1936) as the last case supporting a line of Utah cases requiring im-
peachment by felony. However, p. 370 of the Court's opinion would 
appear to leave the matter to the trial court's discretion so as to allow 
proof of misconduct not amounting to a felony. Wigmore has so inter-
preted this case. Wigmore, op. cit., Vol. III, p. 613. 
13 
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permission to show the defendant's bad character, 
but a liberty to refute his claim that he was a good 
one. Otherwise a defendant, secure from refuta-
tion, would have too clear a license unscrupulous-
ly to impose a false character upon the tribunal.'' 
Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 58. 
The defendant, having placed his good character in 
issue, so far as steady employment, work habits, and hon-
esty, the prosecution was entitled to refute the implica-
tions of such traits of good character. Although it may 
be argued that this should not include reference to spe-
cific misconduct, it is the general rule that specific acts of 
misconduct may be shown on cross-examination of the 
witness himself. Wigmore, op. cit., Sec. 981, notes: 
''The reasons already examined appear plainly to 
have no effect in forbidding the extraction of the 
facts of misconduct from the witness himself on 
cross-examination.'' 
See also Tracy, Handbook of the Law of Evidence (1960), 
p. 177. 
In the instant case the defendant's character trait 
for steady employment was in issue, and the prosecution 
properly examined as to matters which demonstrated that 
his work habits were not such as he claimed, and factors 
which were directly relevant to his honesty. It therefore 
appears that the actions of the prosecution were proper. 
Second, and closely associated with the :first conten-
tion, is the fact that the accused, by his testimony, 
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attempted to show a. steady pattern of employment. 
(R. 39, 43, 44, 45, 52) Thus, evidence that a. substantial 
part of his time was spent in jail because of drunkenness 
or vagrancy is directly relevant to disprove the employ-
ment assertions. Sta.te v. Hougensen., 91 Utah 351, 64 P. 
2d 229 (1936). The evidence was directly contradictory 
to the defendant's previous assertion, and was, therefore, 
directly relevant.2 Wigmore, Evidence, 3rd Ed., Sees. 
1000 et seq. 
Third, it is submitted that cross-examination as to 
these matters, when coupled with the other evidence of 
record demonstrating scanty employment, plus excessive 
drinking habits, forms a motive for the crime. The evi-
dence of the other criminal misconduct demonstrating a 
habitual and uncontrolled use of liquor, and also demon-
strating vagrancy and limited employment, when added 
to the evidence showing extensive drinking on the day 
of the incident, tends to show a motive for the commis-
sion of the crime, that being to obtain money with which 
to buy more booze, and thus an exception to the rule as 
to when other crimes may be shown. McCormick, Evi-
dence, p. 330; Wigmore, supra, Sec. 391; State v. Tacconi, 
110 Utah 212, 171 P. 388 (1946). Thus, as is noted in 
Tracy, supra, p. 331 : 
"To show a motive for the perpetration of a crime, 
the prosecution may offer evidence of the commis-
sion of a similar or different crime, if a logical 
2 The inconsistenecies between the defendant's statement that he and his 
wife worked full time, and that his wife was a good woman, appear of 
record on pages 50-56. 
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inference as to motive can be drawn from such 
evidence.' ' 
The defendant's motive for commission of the crime was 
to obtain money to continue drinking. The evidence of 
habitual or frequent drunkenness to the point of public 
offense and vagrancy, would tend to supply the obvious 
motive for the crime. Thus the examination, tending, 
as it did, to reveal the motive behind the act, was proper. 
In addition, it is noted that in State v. Hougensen, 
supra p. 370, that the court, in one of eleven principles 
of cross-examination, said: 
"Questions whose only object could be to call for 
answers to affect the credibility of the ·witness and 
which answers could tend to degrade his or her 
character, but not tend to subject such witness to 
punishment for a felony, are permissible over a 
general objection as to their relevancy or com-
petency, in the sound discretion of the court.'' 
Thus, the admissibility of such matter is properly left to 
the discretion of the Trial Judge, and certainly the Trial 
Judge acted properly here in exercising his discretion. 
PoiNT III. 
THE CROSS-EXAMINATION OF THE DEFEND-
ANT WAS WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF PROPER 
CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
The contention that the cross-examination of 
the defendant should be deemed cumulative error, 
and thus be held prejudicial, is without merit in view of 
the fact that the examination was legally proper on many 
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bases. The examination appended to the defendant's 
brief concerns the arrests and jail terms of the defend-
ant's wife and himself. It should be remembered that the 
defendant testified on direct examination as to the good 
character of his wife. On cross-examination, in addi-
tion to the matter appended to the defendant's brief, the 
record discloses (R. 50) : 
"Q. You say your wife is a good woman and has 
worked regularly~ 
"A. Yes, sir. 
'' Q. And hasn't been around jails or anything of 
that sort to even know what this thing means~ 
"A. No, sir." 
Thus the evidence of the defendant's wife's stay in jail 
and convictions for drunkenness directly tended to refute 
the defendant's statement and impeach him. There was 
nothing improper in such examination. State v. Herrera, 
8 U. 2d 188, 330 P. 2d 1086 (1958) is no authority for de-
fendant's claim of error. There the defendant was cross-
examined as to extraneous offenses that he was supposed 
to have committed, and which were not directly related to 
character or other issues before the court. In the instant 
case the defendant and a third person's character were 
before the Court, direct in issue, and used by defendant 
to support his claim of innocence. Examination in rela-
tion to this subject was wholly proper. 
Defendant points out that no attempt was made to 
prove some of the offenses. It should be noted that the 
abstract of evidence reflects not that the defendant denied 
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the incidents, but that he did not remember or know the 
specific incidents. Under such circumstances, the testi-
mony is neutral and there is nothing to contradict. In 
addition, such proof was rendered unnecessary because 
the defendant admitted being in jail all the time, but 
could not remember exactly when. The record shows 
on p. 54: 
"Q. Do you want to deny that you were in jail of 
May of 1960? I want to remind you that you have 
taken an oath. 
''A. I don't know if I was in jail in May for get-
ting drunk. I know I get in for being drunk all 
the time, but I work all the time." 
Thus, the defendant admitted the veracity of the cross-
examination and no need for additional proof was re-
quired, since it would merely have been cumulative. 
Cross-examination is one of the essential weapons of 
the prosecution, as well as defense, and in cases where the 
State may have to reply on only one or two witnesses to 
affirmatively prove its case, it may be the major weapon, 
especially where the defendant's story is directly inoppo-
site. If the examination is within recognized rules of 
evidence, courts should be reluctant to say examination 
exceeds the bounds of propritey. It is submitted that the 
examination in the instant case was well within the limits 
approved by the court in State v. Turner, 95 Utah 129, 
79 P. 2d 46 (1938), and hence there is no merit to the 
contention that it was prejudicial. 
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PoiNT IV. 
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO INSTRUCT THE 
JURY THAT THE DEFENDANT'S CONVIC-
TIONS AND HIS WIFE'S PLEA OF GUILTY 
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO CREDIBILITY WAS 
NOT ERROR. 
The defendant finally contends that the Trial Judge 
should have instructed that the evidence of the def{3nd-
ant 's convictions, and his wife's plea of guilty, should be 
considered by the jury only with relation to the defend-
ant's credibility. 
The record reflects that the defendant was given full 
opportunity to request special instructions and to take 
exceptions (R. 68, 69), and although defense counsel was 
concerned with the instructions and took an exception, no 
exception or special request was made for the instruction 
the defendant now contends should have been given. A 
substantial number of cases have said that under these 
circumstances there is a waiver, and no basis for reversal 
exists on appeal. People v. Gray, 66 Cal. 271, 5 Pac. 240; 
Naverrete v. State, 40 S.W. 791 (Tex. Crirn.); People v. 
Bransfield, 289 Ill. 72, 124 N.E. 365; People v. Darr, 262 
Ill. 203, 104 N.E. 389; Stale v. Williams, 94 Vi. 426, 111 
A. 701; Cobb v. Follansbee, 79 N. H. 205, 107 A. 630; 
State v. Fran.cis, 58 Mont. 659, 194 Pac. 304; State v. 
Stokes, 288 Mo. 539, 232 S.W. 106; People v. Rubalcado, 
56 Cal. App. 440,205 Pac. 709; Schonfeld v. United States, 
277 F. 934; Bowman v. Commonwealth, 261 Ky. 215, 87 
S.W. 2d 355. The Utah Supreme Court stated in Stale v. 
Greene, 33 Utah 497, 94 Pac. 987 (1908): 
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"* * *the rule as declared by the great weight of 
authority seems to be that evidence which is com-
petent for certain purposes, and is incompetent for 
other purposes, but is admitted generally, it is 
incumbent upon the party objecting to its recep-
tion, if he desires to have the effect of such evi., 
dence limited to the specific purpose for which it is 
admissible, to ask the Court to inform the jury by 
appropriate instructions as to the purpose for 
which they may consider the evidence, and, if he 
fails to make the request, he cannot afterwards be 
heard to complain.'' 
The defendant relies upon State v. McCurtain, 52 
Utah 53, 172 Pac. 481 (1918) as supporting a requirement 
that the instruction should be given anyway. The deci-
sion does not so hold. There a request was made, which 
the trial judge later ignored. In addition, the court was 
adamant in not being understood as abandoning the rule 
noted above in the Greene case. It said : 
''Let it be distinctly understood, however, that by 
anything we have said herein it is not intended 
to, and we do not, modify the general rule laid 
down by this Court in State v. Green, 33 Utah 
479, 49 Pac. 987, and in Groot v. Railroad, 34 Utah 
164, 96 Pac. 1019. Upon the contrary, we reaffirm 
the general doctrine there stated.'' 
Thus, in the absence of a requested instruction, the de-
fendant may not now complain. Wharton's Criminal Law 
and Procedure, Vol. 5, p. 196. 
It appears additionally, that the defendant's con-
tention is not substantially well taken. As noted above, 
the evidence was admissible for other reasons besides 
credibility, since it disclosed motive, and rebutted char-
acter which was offered to prove guilt or innocence. Fur-
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ther, the wife's plea was relevant to the issue of whether 
she was a prostitute. The Trial Court might well have 
given some clarifying or additional instructions, if a re-
quest had been made, but even so, it does not appear that 
prejudice resulted, especially since the jury was other-
wise properly instructed with respect to their duties and 
prerogatives. The language of State v. W oodaU, 6 U. 2d 
8, 305 P. 2d 473 (1956), involving a similar crime, is note-
worthy here, where much the same objection was raised. 
The court said : 
"It might very well be that if defendant had re-
quested a specific instruction on former prostitu-
tion, he would have been entitled to it, but without 
such request we cannot say that defendant was, by 
the failure to give a special instruction on this 
point, precluded from having a fair and pro:ger 
determination of the issues.'' 
The same is apparent in the instant case, and the defend-
ant's last point is, therefore, unmeritorious. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant was given a full and fair trial within 
the bounds of due process. The record makes manifeest 
that the defendant's conduct, both in and out of the 
coutroom, was the reason for his conviction, and not any 
misconduct by the prosecution. The Court should affirm. 
Respectfully submitted 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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